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Abstract
We aim to show how misleading is to say that liberalism can be based only on a conception of liberty  
as a value and that Kantian liberalism, in particular, describes liberty as a value. An individual can be 
considered  as  a  moral  subject  if  and  only  if  one  can  attribute  him  freedom,  and  therefore 
responsibility.  Thus,  liberty  is a possibility  condition for  every  consistent  moral  and legal  system. 
However, we have to draw a distinction between liberty as a transcendental condition of every moral  
and legal discourse, and freedom as an empirical and highly problematical description of behaviors.
1. Neutrality and Liberalism
One of the most pressing problems for much of contemporary liberalism is to provide a philosophical 
vindication for justice in a world deprived of a untary ethos, or, in broader terms, to formulate a liberal  
political philosophy which overlaps as little as possible moral philosophy. In fact, the independence of 
the two spheres of  problems seems to give  the advantage of  putting to one side the plurality  of  
individual values and ways of life, in the name of a political justice which aims to be neutral in respect  
of  the  fundamental  value  of  the  liberal  tradition,  that  of  individual  autonomy.  A  morally  neutral 
political  philosophy seems more powerful than a philosophical  position linked to a single axiology,  
because it  seems able to dominate a pluralistic world with its arguments, without reference to any 
corpus of shared values. Help in clarifying the terms of this question may be found in a quotation from 
John Rawls:
When Hobbes addressed  the contentious divisions of his day between religious sects, and 
between the  Crown, aristocracy and middle-classes, the basis of his appeal was self-interest: 
men's fear of the death and  their desire  for the means of a commodious life.  On this basis  
he sought to justify obedience to an existing effective (even if  need be absolute) sovereign. 
Hobbes did  not  think  this  form  of  psychological  egoism  was true;  but  he thought  it  was 
accurate enough for his purposes. The assumption was a political one, adopted to give his 
views practical effect. In a society fragmented by sectarian divisions and warring interests, he 
saw no other common foothold for political argument.1
From  Rawls'  point  of  view  Hobbes'  contract  theory  does  not  constitute  the  political  part  of  a 
comprehensive  philosophical  system but must be considered as initiating an autonomous political 
philosophy able to deal with the moral heterogeneity of democratic and pluralistic societies.
Is  it  possible  to  justify  liberal  political  justice  without  contaminating  it,  as it  were,  with  a  moral 
philosophy, with a theory of the "good life"? This kind of question is philosophical, but also political,  
inasmuch as it refers to a society dominated by the polytheism of values and of anthropological pro -
jects. Rawls' type of contract theory proposed to formulate a liberal theory of justice assuming as cri -
teria all what, in an original position, rational individuals protected by a veil  of ignorance would have 
chosen about their own effective  personal and social conditions.2 The communitarian criticism has 
stigmatized Rawls' type of approach insofar as it is inspired by a rationality mistakenly conceived as 
1. J. Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, "Oxford Journal of Legal Studies", 1987, 7/1, p.2. 
See also J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993, pp. 133-172.
2. Id., A Theory of Justice, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. 3-53.
abstractness  and  universalism,  which  in  reality  presupposes  the  justice  characteristic  of  liberal  
individualism, and tries to conceal the fact that any complex of rational principles is historically and 
socially contextual, and hence referable only to individuals rooted in traditions and not to hypothetical,  
bodiless beings.1
Rawls' reply to this criticism refers to the fact that our western political communities are founded on 
no single anthropological-moral doctrine, because of the pluralism and the refusal of democracies to 
use  state  power  against  dissenters2:  in  this  situation,  to  show the  possibility  of  an  overlapping 
consensus, of a consensus to a strictly political justice which overlaps with several  anthropological  
and moral conceptions, seems the only politically efficacious option3.
Rawls,  in fact,  seems to accept the criticisms of  the communitarians in  their  political  sense, and 
defends the efficacy of his system in current conditions, even if  it is still  hard to understand how a 
Neoaristotelian traditionalist, supporter of a comprehensive anthropological and political project, can 
be satisfied with a minimal political justice accepting moral heterogeneity as a fait-accompli; likewise 
a Hobbesian fear of violent death would not dissuade a person bent on martyrdom. But if such is the 
case then Rawls too, like Hobbes, seems to fall before the conflict which he set out to confront: there 
are ethical-political conceptions of the "good life" which refuse to make a distinction between public  
justice and private morality, just as there are human beings who can overcome the fear of a violent  
death. Rawls' project seems to have a paradoxical outcome: his theory is unable, from the political  
point of view, to "superimpose" consensus on anyone who doesn't already agree with it in principle. 
We aim to ask whether we cannot come to terms with this problem more articulately by changing the 
formulation  of  the  distinction  between the  conceptions of  justice  and that  of  the  "good life"  -  a 
commonplace for the liberal wing of the American debate. As we have tried to demonstrate, Rawls'  
attempt  to  indicate  the  conditions  of  political  efficiency  of  his  own theory  of  justice  brings  him  
perilously close to the characteristic uncertainty of the Neoaristotelian approaches, which are able to 
justify the established community, but offer no arguments in cases of conflict,  dissent and disunity.  
The distinction between political justice and good life, then, seems to be the mark of a not even very  
paradoxical liberal communitarianism4.
But to appreciate how full  of risk is this contamination, it may be opportune to examine the way in  
which  another  American  thinker  of  liberal  position,  C.E.  Larmore,  comes  to  terms  with  the 
Neoaristotelian position5. He intends to explain a neutral liberal political justice not as the by-product  
of an impossible rational construction able to stand apart from any conception of the "good life", but 
as able to exclude those moral positions which in the given context are controversial, and refer only  
to those which are shared6.
Larmore  accepts  the  Neoaristotelian  approach  insofar  as  he  sets  the  particular  and  contextual 
character  of  moral  judgement against  the  claims  of  deontological  ethics  of  Kantian  type  and 
teleological positions of utilitarian kind to provide a completely explicit decision-making procedure in 
the moral sphere7.
By moral judgement Larmore means, with Kantian overtones, the faculty of applying the moral rules 
in an appropriate manner to particular circumstances, in cases where such an application entails a 
1 A. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 
1988, pp. 1-11.
2 J. Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, p. 10.
3. J. Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus,  pp. 2-5.  
4. See M. Walzer, The Communitarian Critique to Liberalism, "Political Theory", 18/1, 1990, pp. 6-23. 
5.  C.E. Larmore, Patterns of moral complexity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987; 
Political Liberalism, in  "Political Theory", 18/3, 1990, pp. 339-360. 
6.  C.E. Larmore, Patterns of moral complexity, pp. 42-55,
7.  C.E. Larmore, Patterns of moral complexity, pp. IX-XIII.
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choice between alternative moral points of view1. From this irreducible particularity characteristic of 
every single moral judgement is drawn the thesis of the fundamental heterogeneity of morality:  not 
only do men obey different moral principles, but there exist many ultimate sources of moral values2. A 
similar viewpoint allows Larmore to accept the thesis of the communitarians on the inter-subjective  
constitution of the moral subject, as much as it is based in a social, historical, cultural and traditional 
context3;  at  the same time,  however,  his recognition of  the heterogeneity  of  the moral  principles 
leaves him space to discriminate between ethics and politics, between visions of the "good life" and 
visions of justice. His basic objection to the communitarian Neoaristotelianism of MacIntyre and his 
criticism of the moral fragmentation of liberal-democratic societies refers to the fact that liberalism  
can be formulated simply and exclusively as a political doctrine, and no longer as a general theory of  
human nature4.
At this point we might wonder how a theory which refuses the possibility of discussing moral rules 
beyond their  historical  and cultural  rootedness is  able  to  justify  the distinction  between a liberal  
political  justice,  which  claims  to  be  neutral  respecting  conceptions  of  the  "good  life",  and  the  
individual  anthropological-moral  positions.  How is  it  possible,  in  other  words,  to  speak of  liberal  
neutrality even when limited to political procedures - if  every ethical position is an expression of an  
holistic totality and of an inevitable historical-cultural situation? Larmore answers by characterizing his  
own conception of  liberal  neutrality  as contextual,  even  if  inspired by a moral  principal  of  equal  
respect for persons: to justify a belief under examination it is sufficient to appeal to other shared be-
liefs  not  called in  question in  that  particular  circumstance5.  In  this  sense, liberalism  is a political 
doctrine that can bear moral complexity better than Neoaristotelian approaches, for the very reason 
that it can do without the so-called moral monism, and is able to impose itself on a plurality of values.
The understanding of liberalism carried out by Larmore is very near to the Neoaristotelian positions, 
and shares political and philosophical difficulties with them: it is only able to justify consensus where it  
already exists, where, that is, there is a minimum of shared values which can serve as a basis for  
relatively neutral discussion, but has nothing to say on radical conflicts of values, because it is unable 
to provide a common ground for discussion in the moment of need. 
Would it be possible to overcome this kind of difficulty a little more fully? To attempt an answer to this  
question, we will take up once more the examination of the distinction between political justice and 
conception of the "good life", with reference to an interpretation of Kantian ethics which is not only 
characteristic of Rawls and Larmore, but is also considerably widespread.
2. Liberalism and liberty as value.
Both  Rawls  and Larmore  intend  to  distinguish  their  formulations  of  liberalism  from  the  classical 
versions of Kant and John Stuart Mill, for the reason that, in their opinions, this kind of liberalism is  
not  able  to  sustain  a political  conception of  justice  -  insofar  as it  is  rigorously  separated from a  
comprehensive theory of virtue and of good - and is hence traceable to a value - autonomy for Kant,  
and individualism for Mill  - in competition with the others6.  In fact,  the classical  understandings of 
liberalism as an ethical and political doctrine orientated, in law, in politics and in morality on the basis 
of the value of individual liberty, are not able to cope with the complexity and plurality of values which 
is the principal philosophical and political problem of liberal-democratic societies. On the contrary, a 
liberalism which reduces itself to a strictly political conception of justice can easily include within itself  
1. C.E. Larmore, Patterns of moral complexity, pp. 7-9.
2. C.E. Larmore, Patterns of moral complexity, pp.131-153.
3. C.E. Larmore, Patterns of moral complexity, pp. 11-21.
4. C.E. Larmore, Patterns of moral complexity, pp. 22-39,
5. C.E. Larmore, Patterns of moral complexity, pp. 40-68.
6. C.E. Larmore, Patterns of moral complexity, pp.77-85; J. Rawls, Overlapping Consensus, pp. 5-6.
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the wide range of moral life, by virtue of a relative neutrality which is the by-product of a procedural  
construction.
Of  course, the validity  of  such a political  doctrine rests on the existence of  a basic consensus to  
liberal justice, or on a minimum patrimony of  shared values on the basis of  which politics can be  
guaranteed contextual  neutrality.  Therefore,  whenever the possibility  of  this minimal  agreement is 
lacking - that is, where we are concerned with an irretrievable conflict of values - political philosophy 
not only cannot offer  any solutions,  but  is not  even able to offer  the smallest  contri bution to the 
discussion. And yet, when we speak of conflict of values, we are alluding to a contrast between two or 
more postions theoretically articulated on the basis of some reason, with pretences to intersubjective  
validity: but this understanding of liberalism is not able, at the time of greatest need, to formulate at 
least a moral dialectic, and limits itself to announcing "love me or leave me"?
We may suspect that the distinction between a plurality of comprehensive views of the "good life",  
and a minimal and limited conception of political justice, is simple and evident only in appearance. To  
give this suspicion a basis, we will  scrutinize the criticism of Kant's liberalism undertaken by Rawls 
and, above all,  by Larmore, inasmuch as they are based on a rather widespread interpretation of  
Kantian ethics1.
Larmore characterizes Kantian ethics as centered on a rational moral human nature, which demands 
that  we do not  identify  ourselves  with any vision of  the "good life".  From this point  of  view,  still  
according to Larmore, Kant maintains the priority of right - as a complex of universal moral rules -  
over good, because the lack of an a priori  concept of happiness and of perfection makes the good 
conditioned by the variability  of  empirical  desires,  and hence the exclusive  object  of  completely  
contingent hypothetical imperatives.
Now Larmore, since he partially appropriates the Neoaristotelian approach, includes in morality not 
only the universal rules, but everything which one could define, in the vaguest and most marginal  
way, value, and hence the variety of conceptions of the "good life", and also the obligations stemming  
from a person's social position, including for example the so-called particular duties of friendship. He 
sees in Kant the author of  an identification between universality,  categoricalness and formality  of  
rules, on the one hand, and good on the other: of  course, here the concept of  good includes, in  
Neoaristotelian or pre-Kantian manner, all  that is good for us, and hence not only virtue, but also 
happiness,  and  everything  that  is  pursued  and  recommended  as  value.  And,  thanks  to  this 
identification  between morality  and human good as a whole,  Kant  becomes transformed into  an 
author of a metaphysics which has autonomy as its ideal: our "real personality" is the ability to exist 
beyond empirical  circumstances, to carry out rational choices which do not depend on natural and 
social contingencies, on our conceptions of the good life,  or on our own desires. In Rawls' words:  
"Kant held,  I  believe,  that  a person is acting autonomously when the principles of  his action are 
chosen by him as the most adequate possible expression of his nature as a free and equal rational  
being"2. The moral subject defines himself  on the basis of his ability to create his own character by 
himself.  For  this  reason, in  the Kantian formulation  of  liberalism,  the neutrality  of  the state with  
respect  to conceptions of  happiness is the expression of  an ideal  of  the good life  identified with  
autonomy as value3. And, from Larmore's point of view, this kind of formulation is open to criticism 
1. See for instance  B. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy,  London, Fontana/Collins, 1985, 
pp. 64-69.
2.  J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 252.
3. C.E. Larmore, Patterns of moral complexity  cit., pp. 69-90. Cf. the Kantian criticism of Moore, for 
whom the moral obligation is metaphysically founded - with a naturalistic fallacy - on the nature of the 
rational being, whose character is just that of being obliged by moral laws; see, in this regard K.H. 
Ilting, Der naturalistische Fehlschlub bei Kant, in Rehabilitierung der praktischen Philosophie, hrsg. v. 
M. Riedel,  Freiburg i.  B., Rombach, 1972, pp. 113-130, and S. Landucci,  Sulla meta-etica di Kant 
nella 'Critica della ragion pratica', in "Rivista di filosofia", 81/1, 1990, pp. 57-82.
4
both because it gives an unrealistic characterization of the moral subject, endowing him with a radical  
liberty, able to completely abstract himself from the particularity of the situation, and because, in the 
face of  the demands of  a heterogeneous moral  world,  it  sacrifices the political  justifiability  of  the  
liberal doctrine in favour of an exclusive conception of good, degrading it to the position of a value 
equal with others.
However this interpretation of Kant - based on the metaphysical image of man which accomplish its 
true  essence in  liberty  -  may  seem arguable,  it  may  be useful  to  consider  the meaning  of  this  
identification of liberty with a value.
Kantian ethics,  in the presented version,  could be concentrated in an imperative  of  the kind: "Be  
independent!  Make  your  choices  'rationally',  and  not  on  the  basis  of  customs,  of  your  current 
conception of happiness, or of your own desires!"  Now, to propose liberty in this way as the supreme 
value of  morality,  insofar as it  conforms to the rationality of our "true self",  would be highly prob -
lematical.  Firstly,  we may doubt the descriptive  efficacy of the idea of a radical liberty beyond any 
historical and cultural influence. Secondly, we may ask ourselves whether a moral theory which treats 
liberty as a value is really coherent: what sense and what legitimacy has an imperative of the kind "Be 
free"? If by liberty we mean, negatively, spontaneity as the absence of any type of dependence, any 
attempt to impose liberty as a value by making the command "Be free!"  the object  of  obedience 
would resolve itself  in a contradiction in terms; if,  on the other hand, positively,  we want to endow 
liberty with any content whatsoever, we will have to show how and why that particular content can be 
reconciled with the negative aspect of liberty itself. In this second case, in fact, the immediate object  
of  the command is not liberty,  but the particular content that we wish to impose - for example, in 
Rousseau's manner, "Obey the general will!" -: not succeeding in proving the connection between the 
negative  and positive  aspects of  liberty means, simply,  to transform the attractive  imperative  "Be 
free!" into a rhetorical expedient to command something that has nothing to do with liberty. The usual  
strategy to unite the negative and positive aspects of liberty is the individuation of what we may call  
one's own "real self", the authentic and spontaneous nucleus of the moral personality: and, evidently,  
this strategy leads to a naturalistic fallacy: the "real self", if it were really the authentic nucleus of the 
personality, would operate without the necessity for imperatives to be imposed. 
Is it really correct to speak, in political philosophy, of liberty as a value? Before trying to respond to  
this question, it is opportune to remember the way in which Kant effectively formulated it. First of all,  
for  Kant the knowledge of  moral  laws - which liberty  is connected to as a postulate -  was a fact 
(Faktum)  of  reason1,  that  is  something  valid  in  an  original  way  and  completely  impossible  of  
deduction by others. In other words, according to Kant there is no argument - neither prescriptive nor 
descriptive - able to show why one should be moral: the obligatory character of the law can be felt as 
such only by whoever already feels himself  a participant in the fact of morality 2, and cannot derive 
from a description - empirical or metaphysical - of human nature3. We are, therefore, outside every 
naturalistic fallacy: liberty cannot serve to describe the empirical person, nor a hypothetical "real self",  
because it is only the content of a postulate of pure practical reason, a condition without which the  
moral law cannot be conceived without contradiction4. In other words, when the moral subject asks 
himself  "What  should  I  do?",  he cannot  help  supposing himself  free  -  negatively,  as capable  of  
actions not conditioned by another, and positively as autonomous, or able to formulate his own laws 
for himself5. Autonomy, after all, is the only possible positive content of a liberty which can be known 
exclusively taking the moral law as a starting point, and which can never be attributed in experience 
1. I. Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, A 55-56.
2. See in this respect  V. Mathieu, Kant e il concetto della responsabilità individuale, in A. Fabris e L. 
Baccelli (eds.), A partire da Kant, Milano, Angeli, 1989, pp. 15-24.
3. I. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten,  BA 122-128. 
4. I. Kant., Kritik der praktischen Vernunft,  A 238-288.
5. I. Kant., Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, BA 97-101
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to absolute spontaneity, originality, beginning ex nihilo, insofar as knowledge is always a connection 
of elements in a system of reciprocal dependence. 
If we translate this thesis of Kant into the philosophical language of our day, we would have to affirm  
that  liberty  is not,  properly,  a value  amongst others, nor,  still  less,  an anthropological-descriptive  
element,  but a condition of  reflection on values, a condition able to be the object of  a postulate,  
because it is not knowable nor usable as a description of man as an effectively living being in society. 
The fact that liberty is exclusively knowable as a pre-supposition and possibility condition for values 
and of  our discussion of  them,  and not  vice-versa,  ensures that  it  is  completely  unusable as an 
essential  anthropological-moral  element  of  a  hypothetical  "real  self"  of  metaphysical  type.  The 
communitarians and Larmore have good reasons to reject as illusory the idea of an empirical moral 
subject  able  to  determine  its  own values,  choices  and  character  entirely  by  itself:  they  cannot, 
however, as authors of ethical and political theories, degrade coherently liberty to a value available 
with other values. This would imply the logical error of valuing - and eventually abandoning - the pos-
sibility condition (freedom) on the basis of the result (values) which follows from it.
On the basis of  the foregoing,  we can attempt  to reformulate the distinction between justice and 
conceptions of the "good life" by subtracting liberty from the group of substantive values, and raising  
it to a possibility condition in political and ethical discussion and choice. Since any theory of political  
justice and of the "good life" which presents arguments on values makes sense only on the basis of  
the presupposition of  liberty,  no axiology can - without  contradiction -  treat  the presupposition in  
question as a value available amongst others. In other words: liberty is the insuperable limit  for any 
kind of moral discourse, a limit which should be respected by anyone who recognizes the pluralism of 
values.  Indeed,  we may classify  ethical-political  theories in  two groups,  according to  the relation 
between liberty and the values which it makes possible:
a)  ethics  which  assume  next  to  liberty  in  a  negative  sense  as  capacity  for  self-determination 
(indispensable  because it  offers  a  moral  subject  onto  which  values  can  be directed),  a  specific  
content of values as well; they may assume, for example, some conception of the "good life", justified 
on the basis of a different reason than liberty itself. In this category come, for instance, the moral and 
political theories which justify the proposed values on the basis of some metaphysical conception of 
human nature;
b)  ethics  which  try  to  articulate  exclusively  that  liberty  which  operates  as  their  own  possibility  
condition, making abstractions of values conditioned by it.
The specific difficulty of the ethics of group sub a) is the conciliation between negative liberty - which 
they are obliged to presuppose - and the justification of the substantive values proposed by them: for 
example, if we start with a conception of human nature endowed with onto-axiological necessity, it is 
hard to understand what is the place of that negative liberty which is the indispensable condition of 
every moral  prescription, but which appears to be in contradiction with the idea of  a necessitating 
nature. Furthermore, how to explain the plurality of conceptions of the "good life"?
As far as the ethics of the group sub b) are concerned, one of the principal problems is the relation  
between the form and the content of liberty on the basis of which they orientate themselves: in fact,  
the attribution of a specific content to liberty can transform the alleged ethic of the category sub b) 
into one of the group sub a), burdened with the same practical difficulties. 
From the strictly political  point of  view, the tension, characteristic of  all  the theories which can be 
listed amongst the ethics of group sub a), between negative liberty and substantive values, produces 
a totalitarian temptation: if we really know with certainty what is the good for man, why should it not  
be right to constrain dissenters to accept it? If a good for man beyond his possibility condi tion really 
exists, why not carry it out once for all  by suppressing, as far as possible, every expression of the 
condition itself? If, on the other hand, it were really possible to formulate an ethic endowed with the 
characteristics of group sub b), it would bring about a liberal justice, aiming at the maximum neutrality  
with respect of the single conceptions of the "good life", insofar as it would be oriented exclusively on 
the basis of axiologically unavailable concepts, of moral liberty as capacity for self-determination, or 
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as indispensable medium to accede morally to substantive values of  any kind. This formulation of 
liberal  justice,  on the other  hand,  would  not  be sustained by  the  precarious maximum  common 
denominator of values shared at that moment, but would be able to present itself as neutral guarantor 
of  the possibility  for self-determination of  everyone. Furthermore, theoretical  discussion of  the so-
called values would not be condemned to be stopped by the fact of pluralism, because the condition 
of liberty would be its common ground.
Of  course,  as liberty  is  known exclusively  as the possibility  condition  for  any political  and moral 
theory,  the  whole  following  construction  should  not  contain  any  anthropological  and  descriptive  
element, which would make it fall into the dualism, typical of those ethics of group sub a), between  
liberty and the content of liberty: the system requires the maximum formality and abstractness. This 
theory aims to  be both  political  and moral,  and bases itself  on a rigorous distinction  between a 
possibility condition, liberty, and all the values which it makes possible because they do not contradict  
their condition.
This sketch of  moral  theory would be threatened by the inherent  difficulties of  interpretation of  a 
universe of experience in terms of a formal hypothetical-deductive system. Firstly,  since the liberty 
which distinguishes the moral subject is only accessible as a postulate, as a possibility condition of  
practical reasoning, no certain empirical mark would be available, within the system, which would en-
able to qualify anyone as a moral subject. In the second place, the task of justice would be in any 
case that of guaranteeing not moral liberty - which is in any case still pre-supposed - but, rather, its  
highly problematical phenomenal image1. In other words: liberty, insofar as it represents capacity for 
self-determination, is a postulate which conditions the possibility of every kind of ethical and political 
discourse, always pre- supposed except in cases of pure and simple violence in which no distinction 
is made,  from the point  of  view of  treatment,  between persons and things.  On the contrary,  the 
"maximum liberty possible under laws" is something requiring anthropological determination, and is 
hence subject to discussion. We will take into consideration the example with which Hobbes, in  De 
Cive, illustrates the concept of  liberty:  "Water  contained in  a vase is not free,  because the vase 
prevents  its  spreading,  and it  is  only  liberated  by  the  breaking  of  the  vase"2.  Hobbes does not 
discriminate at all, as far as the applicability of the predicate "liberty" is concerned, between a moral  
agent endowed with liberty  as a capacity  for  self-determination and moral  responsibility,  and any 
agent whatsoever which moves on the basis of deterministic laws: liberty is always reduced in any 
case to the possibility of carrying out certain movements without obstruction. In effect, in his overall 
thinking the personalitas moralis is something irrelevant, inasmuch as the fear of the summum malum 
of violent death is an unshakeable certainty which governs and determines human nature beyond any 
value. However, also those who recognize a real pluralism of values, deprived a maximum common 
denominator  given by nature, and who morally accept liberty as a condition of ethical evaluation and 
attribution  of  responsibility,  cannot,  in  a  political  and  juridical  sphere,  help  conceiving  liberty, 
anthropologically,  in Hobbes' manner, as the physical possibility of action and of movement. And, if  
such is the case, a justice which is concerned with guaranteeing maximum liberty as a possibility 
condition for every ethical and every political  action, is concerned not with liberty as an intangible  
postulate, but with its highly uncertain and ever-changing juridical and political image.
However, this kind of approach permits theory to discuss political and moral problems much more 
deeply  than whoever,  starting  from  the fact  of  pluralism,  reduces political  philosophy to  a blank 
cheque, completely superfluous, in favour of the minimal  patrimony of values shared at any given 
moment,  and  transforms  axiology  into  a  no  man’s  land,  shut  off  to  any  attempt  at  theoretical  
argumentation.
1. G. Tomasi,  L'idea della formazione dello stato fra felicità e libertà. Note sul rapporto fra politica e  
filosofia pratica in Kant, in "Verifiche", 19/4, 1990, pp. 435-88.
2. T. Hobbes, Elementorum philosophiae sectio tertia de cive,  IX, 8.
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